The politics of rate support grant distribution by Midwinter, Arthur et al.
Scottish Government Yearbook 1986 




Local government finance and the rating system has been a persistent 
problem for the Conservative Government. The 1985 property re-
valuation, which altered the balance of tax liability in favour of industrial 
ratepayers, generated a short-term political crisis which the Government 
temporarily solved by increasing government grant in the form of direct 
subsidies to all domestic ratepayers and those small business ratepayers 
particularly adversely affected, and by promising rating reform in the 
future. 
The revaluation issue received much public and media attention, and it 
is not unfair to suggest that the reason "something was done" was because 
of the immediacy of the problem and its adverse implications for the 
Conservative heartland. Yet another reform, which has equally 
redistributive implications, the change in the method of distributing rate 
support grant, received little public attention. In part, this is because the 
detailed working papers are considered in private by the Distribution 
Committee of the Working Party on Local Government Finance. 
Moreover, unlike the immediacy of revaluation the Government and 
COS LA are in agreement that authorities' 'grant loss' should be moderated 
in any one year. The political repercussions, therefore, tend to be much less 
dramatic on a yearly basis, but the financial repercussions can be 
considerable over a period of years. 
The new method, known as the Client Group Approach, is regarded 
by the Scottish Office as being "technically sounder" than the old 
demographic approach. Under the previous method, distribution of grant 
was based on a simple formula dependent mainly on the total population of 
each authority {about 80% of needs assessment), with weightings for 
numbers of children, and the elderly, and adjustments for specific factors 
such as sparsity, density, and acute population decline. The demographic 
approach cannot be regarded as a serious attempt at needs measurement, 
had a heavy emphasis on judgment, and no causal model of need was 
provided to link the factors used with expenditure. As David Heald has 
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observed, the Scottish Needs Element's lack of precision allowed political 
factors to determine the distribution of resources. 
"It is not too unkind to describe the'Scottish Needs Element as a case 
of the needs formula . . being chosen to 'produce' the desired 
answer. "(l) 
The simple demographic approach had little to commend it as an 
attempt at rieeds measurement. Its virtues were simplicity and stability of 
grant distribution. The Client Group Approach was first introduced for 
current expenditure guidelines in 1982-3, and has been described as a 
simple and defensible way of estimating expenditure need. It has certain 
key features. (Z) It allocates a predetermined level of expenditure provision 
among local authorities; it does not in itself determine the level of provision 
in absolute terms. The objective of the approach is to estimate what 
authorities with similar relevant characteristics would need to spend in 
order to provide a similar standard of service with a similar degree of 
efficiency. 
There are two stages in the calculation. First, a primary indicator is 
defined for each component of a service, and the predetermined total of 
expenditure is then distributed among authorities according to the number 
of clients for that service in that authority. The primary indicator is seen as 
being the main determinant of demand and having the strongest influence 
on expenditure. 
Secondly, analysis of past expenditure is carried out to identify any 
characteristics outside the control of authorities which have a systematic 
effect on expenditure. Secondary indicators, therefore, represent factors 
which cause local variations in unit costs of provision and/or demand for the 
service. The technique used is linear multiple regression analysis and 
expenditure need is redistributed via the incidence of the variable as a 
secondary effect. 
We do not intend to produce a critique of the Client Group method in 
this paper, but we have done so elsewhere. (J) Our view is that, theoretically, 
major problems exist in the approach due to the lack of clarity, definition 
and purpose, and uncertainty of measurement. From the emphasis on 
average service provision in the principles outlined, we would argue that 
such a system would inevitably lead to increased needs assessment and 
grant income for past low spenders, and decreases for high spenders. 
When the method was first used for current expenditure guidelines, 
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central-local relationships had reached a new low. The Convention of 
Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA) had adopted a position of outright 
opposition to the use of guidelines in any fashion, and therefore was 
unwilling to see them becoming more soundly based. 
The credibility of the guideline system was on the wane with local 
government. Whilst these were purely indicative, this was unimportant. By 
1982-3, the guidelines were being used to identify "high spenders" under 
the Government's new powers of control. The needs of expenditure 
control, however, require guidelines to be regarded as "achievable" if 
authorities are to make any effort to meet them. <4l If the Client Group 
Approach had been introduced in its own right, this could have resulted in 
considerable variation from the previous year in several cases. Thus the 
Government had insisted that where the assessment demonstrated a higher 
need to spend, the local authority was not to receive a guideline which 
encouraged it to increase its spending. 
As a result, three policy adjustments were added to the Client Group 
assessments, for multiple deprivation, the discouragement of increased 
expenditure, and for damping. The effect of this was to align guidelines in 
general with authorities' own relative expenditure patterns. 
Officially, COSLA regarded the new method as no better than its 
predecessors, and the policy adjustments were described as tampering with 
the figures for irrelevant reasons such as past expenditure levels or the 
achievement of stability. Given the known intention to introduce the 
method for grant distribution, this was a somewhat short-sighted attack on 
the guidelines. 
At this stage micro-politics began to play a key role. Highland Region 
stood to lose considerably if the new approach was used for grant 
distribution, and the council lobbied hard to have its guideline increased. (s) 
The credibility of the guidelines was further eroded when the Scottish 
Office stated that the method could not take proper account of the needs of 
Highland Region (because of extreme sparsity) and an ad hoc adjustment 
was made to restore Highland Region to its relative position of 1981-2. 
COSLA's lobbying for the removal of the policy adjustments also 
occurred in 1983-4, and this revealed for the first time the precarious 
position of Strathclyde Region. Whilst the Council's finance officials had 
been lukewarm supporters of the Client Group Approach in the 
deliberative stages, the potential loss of grant income in future hardened its 
political attitude. Through COSLA, reviews were sought of the impact of 
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sparsity and multiple deprivation on expenditure, and the problem of 
unmet need. 
In 1984-5, the Secretary of State consulted with COS LA as to whether 
the approach should now be used for grant distribution purposes. 
Strathclyde Region's political strength in the COSLA Labour Group 
ensured that COSLA would oppose this, asking for a further year of review 
and refinement. At this stage, however, it had become clear that a majority 
of regions would gain from the changeover. We learned of one regional 
chief executive actively lobbying for the change, including writing to a 
national newspaper inviting their local government correspondent to seek 
the views of individual authorities on the matter. When this was done, the 
divisions in COSLA became public, and the unified case against 
introduction as presented by the Convention was considerably weakened. 
As a result, the Client Group Approach was used as the basis of grant 
distribution in 1984-5, but with limitations on grant losses at £6.45 per head 
of population at regional level and £2.58 at district level. Authorities who 
stood to gain from the Client Group Approach received their 1983-4 grant 
increased by the residual amount of needs grant available (£1 per head of 
population for regional councils and 9p for district councils.). This decision 
has led to continuing disagreement within COSLA, authorities standing to 
gain resources pressing for immediate implementation, and those likely to 
lose resources arguing the need for long-term dampening effects and 
refinement of the formula. 
Indeed authorities who gained resources argued their rates were 
higher than they "should be" because of the phased implementation and 
vice versa! 
Inevitably, local authority attitudes toward the Approach per se are 
coloured by the resource implications for themselves. To examine this, we 
sent a questionnaire to all65 directors of finance, and achieved a response 
rate of65%. 
Two features of the results surprised us. Firstly, only 38% of 
authorities actually produced a written report for their councils explaining 
the method and its resource implications, although in several cases this was 
communicated orally. Secondly, only 24% of authorities had made 
representations to the Scottish Office about particular service treatments. 
This would tend to suggest a high degree of acceptability with the method. 
In our view, however, it also reflects the difficulty officers face who are not 
privy to the deliberations of the Working Party on Local Government 
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Finance, for in the training seminars we have given on the subject around 
the country, it has been clear that some directors of finance are unsure 
about the mechanisms of the approach. 
This view is reinforced by more detailed analysis of local authority 
responses. Where reports were prepared for councils in the majority of 
cases this amounted to little more than reiteration of the circulated Scottish 
Office account of the method, and gave little indication of a critical grasp of 
its essential elements. The responses to our questions on finance directors' 
views of the method were characterised by two qualities in the majority of 
cases: imprecision and fatalism. 
The imprecision arose from the use of terms such as 'fairer', 'better' or 
'technically sounder' than the previous method, without any specification 
of what those terms meant or what kind of analytical considerations 
informed such judgments. Equally, those who had complaints about the 
method in general, or about particular treatments seemed often to be 
confused about the relative rather than absolute assessment of need 
produced by the method. The fatalism was expressed in statements about 
'the impossibility of an objective assessment of needs' and the Client Group 
Approach 'being as good as we are going to get'. This pessimism reflects 
past experience, but it was often advanced on the basis of lack of clarity 
about the method and its purpose. 
This strengthens our argument that councils' attitudes were 
determined more by financial considerations than considerations of 
methodology and techniques. In fact, councils divided exactly on support 
for the introduction of the method. Councils can 'gain' in two ways. Firstly, 
they can receive an increase in their needs assessment, which permits 
higher expenditure for guideline purposes. Secondly, councils can gain in 
increased grant, which allows lower rates poundages. What we discovered 
from our survey was of those councils supporting the introduction of the 
Client Group Approach, the majority were potential "winners". 
TABLE 1 
IMPACT OF CHANGE OF METHOD ON AUTHORITIES IN FAVOUR 
OF THE INTRODUCTION OF THE CLIENT GROUP APPROACH 
Need Resources Both 
%Gaining 65% 70% 55% 
%Losing 20% 25% 15% 
No Change 15% 5% 30% 
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In short, 85% of those supporting the introduction of the Client Group 
Approach stood to gain or the method had no impact on them. 
For those in opposition to the introduction, the survey revealed quite 
clearly that Joss of resources was significantly related to opposition to the 
introduction of the method. 
TABLE2 
IMPACT OF CHANGE OF METHOD ON AUTHORITIES OPPOSED TO 
THE INTRODUCTION OF THE CLIENT GROUP APPROACH 
Need Resources Both 
%Gaining 90% 30% 30% 
%Losing 10% 65% 5% 
No Change 5% 60% 
This may seem a strange contrast to the previous table, but in fact it is 
consistent with the political position adopted by COSLA. Eleven 
Strathclyde districts who stood to gain in terms of their assessed need, but 
whose ratepayers would lose as Strathclyde Region ratepayers, opposed 
the introduction of the approach. Why was it that the most rural, and the 
most urban regions stood to lose most from the changeover? In part, the 
answer lies in the nature of the Client Group Approach, with its emphasis 
on average spending and services. Authorities with unusual characteristics 
are unlikely to have their needs fully compensated for under the regression 
method, or through assessments based on broad population groups only. 
This can be examined further by comparing the treatments of sparsity and 
urban decline under the demographic and Client Group method. Under the 
demographic method, the judgmental weightings concentrated resources 
in authorities which were heavily urban or rural. Table 3 shows that 
Highland Region and the three Islands councils benefitted most from these 
adjustments for sparsity, and Strathclyde, and to a lesser extent Lothian, 
from the urban weightings. 
At district level, resources were also concentrated on the extremely 
rural councils, and only six councils received weightings, Badenoch and 
Strathspey, Lochaber, Ross and Cromarty, Skye and Lochalsh, Sutherland 
and Argyll and Bute. For the urban factor, only four councils received 
weightings for population decline, Clyde bank, Cumnock and Doon Valley, 
Glasgow and Inverclyde, and only five councils for density, Aberdeen, 
Edinburgh, Bearsden, Clydebank and Glasgow. 
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TABLE3 
WEIGHTINGS FOR POPULATION DECLINE, SPARSITY AND 
DENSITY UNDER THE DEMOGRAPIDC METHOD OF GRANT 




































Thus although a greater proportion of needs assessment is based on 
sparsity factors under the present approach, these resources are spread 
more widely, and 'average' authorities (such as Fife and Central Regions) 
gain resources via the Client Group method. 
This had dramatic results for Highland, Strathclyde and Lothian 
Regions, for whereas the demographic weightings gave additional 
resources to some, the client group weightings also took resources away 
from others. 
These results in 1984-5, however, reflect the relatively successful 
outcome of the review of sparsity and the less successful results in the 
review of multiple deprivation. By 1984-5, when the method finally formed 
the basis of grant distribution, various measures of sparsity effects had been 
introduced. In fact, seven regional and three district service treatments had 
adjustments for sparsity factors. By contrast, only three regional and two 
district service treatments had adjustments for population density and 
deprivation. Although Strathclyde gained some modest additional 
resources from the deprivation adjustments, it lost more through the 
sparsity adjustments. 
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TABLE4 
REGIONAL WEIGHTINGS FOR SPARSITY, DENSITY AND URBAN 
DECLINE AS A PROPORTION OF NEEDS ASSESSMENTS UNDER 
THE DEMOGRAPHIC AND CLIENT GROUP APPROACHES 
1983-4 1984-5 
Borders + 3.4% + 3.58% 
Central + 5.8% - 1.5% 
Dumfries + 4.2% + 4.0% 
Fife + 5.0% + 0.1% 
Grampian + 6.0% + 0.1% 
Highland +26.4% + 4.8% 
Lothian + 9.7% - 1.3% 
Strathclyde +23.0% - 0.4% 
Tayside + 5.3% - 1.2% 
Orkney + 6.0% + 8.2% 
Shetland + 7.1% + 7.3% 
Western Isles +15.0% + 8.3% 
TABLES 
PROPORTION OF NEEDS ASSESSMENT BASED ON WEIGHTINGS 
FOR SPARSITY, DENSITY, AND URBAN DECLINE UNDER THE 













These sparsity adjustments were particularly important for Highland 
Region and for the rural districts. Not only did they restore Highland to its 
1981-2 position in terms of assessed need, it actually increased their relative 
position. The three islands councils have also gained considerably, as have 
most of the rural districts, some having quite dramatic increases from the 
adjustments, with Sutherland District topping the bill with an 80.8% 
increase in three years, compared to the Scottish average of 14.2%. 
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These changes are recorded for regional councils, along with the rural 
settlement pattern measure (proportion of populations living in settlements 
of less than 10,000) in Table 6 below. 
TABLE6 
PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN GUIDELINES AND NEEDS 
ASSESSMENTS FOR REGIONAL AND ISLAND COUNCILS 
BETWEEN 1982-3 AND 1985-6 
Authority (Settlement Guidelines Needs 
Pattern) Assessment 
Borders ( 70.8) +16.9 +21.1 
Central ( 26.8) +20.4 +15.8 
Dumfries ( 70.3) +18.1 +20.7 
Fife ( 46.7) +14.0 +21.3 
Grampian ( 49.3) +17.2 +17.7 
Highland ( 73.8) +26.4 +26.4 
Lothian ( 22.4) +15.6 +10.3 
Strathclyde ( 17.1) +13.9 +11.6 
Tayside ( 31.3) +17.6 +17.6 
Orkney (100.0) +24.1 +27.5 
Shetland (100.0) +70.0 +56.0 
Western Isles (100.0) +28.0 +33.5 
Scotland ( 30.6) +17.4 +14.2 
The pattern in this Table is quite clear. The island and regional rural 
councils gained considerably from the changes in the Client Group 
treatments since 1982-83, with Strathclyde and Lothian Regions (the two 
largest) the main losers. This is inevitable given the size and characteristics 
of Strathclyde. If Strathclyde benefits from a change, almost everyone else 
will lose. (This state of affairs must be less than useful to Strathclyde in the 
deliberations of the Distribution Committee). Some considerable increases 
also occurred to rural districts from the changes, and these are recorded in 
Table 7. 
The final factor we have to take account of is the impact of withdrawing 
the specific allowance for oil-related expenditure. This was withdrawn on 
the theoretical assumption that the Client Group Approach would 
systematically and comprehensively take account of need. In fact, with the 
limits of the regression analysis, even if tests were carried out it is doubtful 
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TABLE? 
PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN GUIDELINES AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT 
FOR RURAL DISTRICTS BETWEEN 1982-83 AND 1985-86 
Authority (Settlement Guidelines Needs 
Pattern) 
Berwick 52.7 26.1 9.8 
Ettrick 24.2 39.2 12.8 
Roxburgh 25.4 33.8 11.1 
Tweedale 35.6 21.9 18.5 
Annandale 35.3 35.1 9.1 
Nithsdale 24.1 23.2 10.4 
Stewartry 51.6 27.7 26.1 
Wigtown 49.3 40.7 26.6 
Badenoch 52.5 36.5 53.5 
Caithness 38.4 17.1 29.5 
Inverness 21.6 26.1 11.9 
Lochaber 37.8 20.6 31.6 
Nairn 23.6 22.3 9.6 
Ross and Cromarty 42.6 40.0 45.6 
Skye and Lochalsh 85.6 54.4 59.7 
Sutherland 76.2 42.0 80.8 
All Districts 11.2 17.4 14.2 
if these would reveal anything given the small number of councils affected. 
The only way to ensure allowance is made for such factors would be via a 
specific allowance. The scheme of special financial assistance to local 
authorities incurring extraordinary expenses in connection with offshore 
petroleum developments was introduced in 1975-6 in recognition of the fact 
that the existing Rate Support Grant system did not adequately cater for 
the heavy expenditure which certain local authorities had to meet to 
provide the oil infrastructure. 
In rating terms, the grant was really significant for only two 
authorities, Grampian and Highland Regions. The Government argued, 
however, that it had become progressively more difficult to judge the need 
for the continuation of the grant. They argued, moreover, that the Client 
Group Approach allowed a 'much more precise' measurement of 
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expenditure needs on individual services, and thus removed the need for 
special arrangements. Whatever the accuracy of this observation, the 
financial implications of it were considerable, for Grampian Region, the 
equivalent of a 5.5p rate, and of llp for Highland Region. When it was 
withdrawn for 1984-5, the result overall changed Grampian's position from 
being a net gainer of resources to a marginal one, and the benefits of the 
additional resources gained by Highland for sparsity factors were 
eliminated, with the authority also being a net 'loser' in terms of grant 
income. We are not in a position ourselves to make any realistic assessment 
of the arguments made for the withdrawal of grant, but we remain sceptical 
of the ability of the Client Group Approach to take account of such factDrs 
when they only affect a few authorities. 
CONCLUSION 
The distribution of rate support grant remains a highly political game. 
Understanding of the critical elements of the Client Group Approach is 
relatively weak in local government, and therefore those who chose to 
support its use for grant distribution were informed more by considerations 
of financial gain than the provision of a robust, analytical methodology. 
Our view is that in the long run some of those authorities may regret it, for 
as we have shown elsewhere, many of the existing treatments are highly 
suspect and capable of refinement and improvement. Indeed, there have 
been regular changes in service treatments for the past two years. 
Our research also reveals an increased awareness and concern for the 
Client Group methodology in several authorities. Representations to the 
Scottish Office with complaints about specific treatments is becoming more 
common. 
We feel, however, that if the whole process whereby treatments are 
generated were made more open prior to the application of particular 
treatments in grant distribution, this would improve the situation. At the 
present moment authorities can only suggest a refinement, criticism or 
alternatives to treatments after they have been accepted by the Distribution 
Committee. This can only serve to further politicise the arguments, as 
authorities are inevitably forced into a critical stance on treatments that 
significantly affect their ratepayers. 
Finally, we feel that COSLA ought to have its own equivalent of the 
Scottish Office's Central Research Unit, to provide for balance on the local 
authority's side. At the moment, the local authority representation is 
composed of directors of finance and chief executives nominated by their 
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respective professional assoctatlons, and two technical advisers, both 
qualified planners. These are all, however, employees of particular local 
authorities, and their contributions to discussion invariably reflect the local 
implications of the proposals for change. 
In the zero-sum game of grant distribution, the interests of the 
involved parties will often conflict. Our view is that efforts to provide a set 
of systematically developed and objectively defended treatments is the only 
possible way to confer legitimacy on the resulting grant distribution and a 
central analytical capacity within COSLA would provide a further check on 
the inevitable partisanship of the current form of local consultation and 
representation. 
Moreover, there should be far greater discussion with the relevant 
authorities during the development and refinement of treatments in 
advance of submission of proposed treatments to the Committee. 
Where resources are fixedly and increasingly limited, political 
behaviour in decision-making is inevitable. It is in the wider public interest, 
however, that it should be contained, and the possibilities for more 
detached comment and more widespread observation be pursued. 
*This paper is drawn heavily from a research report prepared for the 
Chartered Association of Certified Accountants. 
Arthur Midwinter, Colin Mair and Charles Ford. Public Sector 
Management Unit, Strathclyde Business School 
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